ment also closely controls business in a setting that is often categorised as 'state corporatism.'
Organized criminal groups have little independent room for maneuver and are usually closely controlled by the state.
In contrast, other states are centralized but politically competitive. In Ukraine or Armenia, corrupt actors such as organized criminals and unscrupulous business people have more bargaining capacity due to the diffusion and fragmentation of political power. In contrast to non-competitive states, political leaders in these places do not get everything their own way. They have to compete to capture some markets. Criminal and business interests have more choice over their patrons.
The goal of the paper is to give more depth and detail to such examples, in order to illuminate the way in which levels of political competition is affecting corruption and collusion in the region. It suggests avenues for hypothesis building concerning relationships between political systems and collusion as well as asking questions about where anti-corruption strategies are more likely to emerge. First, I provide some definitions of political corruption and some background into the issue of corruption and collusion in terms of its development in the post-Soviet period.
Soviet Legacies and Transition: The Development of Post-Soviet Collusion
In political science as well as criminology, scholars tend to distinguish between crimes committed by public officials on behalf of the state and those they perpetrate for private advantage (Friedrichs 2007, Friedrichs and Rothe 2012) . The former is usually understood as state crime and the latter as political corruption. Philp's (2008) approach to political corruption is the most comprehensive because it accommodates often-overlooked issues such as influence trading, systems of patronage, the use of legal means to deliver favours, and illegal funding to groups rather than individuals that can indirectly lead to private gain (see also Yadav 2011) . According to Philp (2008, p. 315) , 'corruption in politics occurs where a public official (A), acting in ways that violate the rules and norms of office, and that involve personal, partisan or sec-tional gain, harms the interests of the public (B) (or some sub-section there-of) who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/or a third party (C) who rewards or otherwise incentivises A to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise obtain.' I will use this definition of political corruption as the grounds for the collusion of states, business and organized crime in the post-Soviet region.
Collusive links between politics and organised crime date back to the roots of the Soviet Union. The Soviet secret police drew heavily on criminals as informers and executioners, and Vladimir Lenin enlisted criminal groups to swell the treasury of the fledgling Communist Party (Coulloudon 1997, p. 75.) Josef Stalin also used Soviet criminal groups in an attempt to destabilise Western economies by printing massive quantities of counterfeit money (Shelley in Godson 2003, p. 207) . Through the Soviet era, bureaucrats who controlled state-owned enterprises extended their criminal ties to secure access to a black market that filled significant gaps produced by incessant product shortages. Thess relationships, which transformed over time, ultimately helped shape a new elite in post-Soviet countries.
The most powerful groups to emerge were those which incorporated former members of the Communist Party elite, former and serving members of the state security organs, an emerging class of post-Soviet entrepreneurs, and professional criminals. These entities maintained 'one foot in the black market, the old criminal world, and another foot in the official world, the world of politics and the old structure of the party' (Shelley 1994) . Individuals once in charge of Soviet bureaucratic structures and industrial enterprise were left in possession of vast human, material and administrative resources. This situation provided an avenue through which the benefits of occupying political office or having access to political office at a time of privatization in the 1990s were quickly recognised.
Through the early 1990s, criminal groups gained significant inroads in leveraging control over economic sectors of interest. Among the first sectors they targeted in Russia, especially between 1992 and 1996, was banking. Apart from the obvious benefit of simplifying money laundering, banks allowed direct access to capital resources (either directly or at preferential credit) and facilitated extortion and corruption. Banks thus were seen as holding a special kind of power in the market economy -they facilitated a way to further enmesh the interests of these entities into the 'foundations of the emerging Russian state' (Lowther 1997) .
In August 1995, the MVD All-Russian Scientific Research Institute estimated that criminal groups operating in Russia alone controlled over 400 banks and 47 exchanges (Izvestia Analytical Centre 1994).
Criminal groups infiltrated other sectors too, including the production of aluminum and coal mining. In 1997, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kulikov remarked in a speech to the Duma that the aluminum sector was 'completely criminalised despite remaining competitive in the world market ' (Kommersant Daily 1997) . Political influence accompanied control over these industries, along with the ability to penetrate others, such as consumer markets, including alcohol and tobacco, the construction industry, the computer market, and the automobile sector.
The Russian experience was replicated in other post-Soviet republics, albeit with varying degrees of collusion between legal and illegal actors. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the alliances between state and organised crime emerged with shifting dominance between political and criminal leaders (Marat 2006) . In Georgia, Jaba Ioseliani, a professional criminal and a member of a criminal elite caste born out of the prison camps of the Gulag and known as thieves-in-law, became one of the leading political figures in the 1990s. In Ukraine, regionally based corrupt networks comprising criminals and politicians took over large shares of local economies (Shelley 2003) .
This period was essential in laying the framework for how private enterprise and state interests interacted in the post-Soviet context. Although the nexus between political and entrepreneurial actors was recognised, an undeveloped legal and regulatory framework was navigated in such a way as to conceal ownership. Dummy and front companies, straw men, and a maze of subsidiary firms became the norm of ownership structures. This nexus provided these composite groups with access to a plethora of foreign networks, providing routes to international markets, both for licit and illicit goods.
As Ganev (2005) argues, the major point of departure in studying the development of post-Soviet societies is the redistribution of the huge state resources inherited from the Soviet system. Post-Soviet economic reform involved the hollowing out of the state and the redistri- The latter under-emphasizes the importance of path dependency in framing practices, relationships and the criminal opportunity structures emerging from the experience of the Soviet period. Since post-communist Eastern European countries are far more corrupt than many other nation states, (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005) , the obvious explanatory factor, for this school of thought, can be found in patterns of communist social organisation that established power asymmetries, status groups and the practice of dealing with things informally (Mungiu Pippidi 2013). In contrast, the former underestimates the extreme shock of the chaotic period of the early 1990s. In fact, the post-Soviet transition often created new opportunities for exploiting long-standing relationships, old practices and understandings (Karklins, 2005 , Schmidt 2007 ).
Despite similar historical trajectories and Soviet legacies, political corruption and collusion now varies significantly across the post-Soviet region. The rest of this paper uncovers the ways in which the countries of the region have diverged and the relationship of this divergence to the type of political system that has emerged. In particular, I look at the role of political competition and the centralization of power in influencing the extent of collusion across the countries of the region.
From Chaos to Collusion: Dynamics of Political Competition and Centralization
Political competition is generally held to be one of the most important mechanisms in controlling corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 149) . A multitude of actors vying for power are more likely to monitor and hold each other in check (Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2002, Grzymala-Busse 2003) . However, the simple proposition that political competition reduces corruption lacks compelling empirical evidence (Svensson 2005) . From the politically decentralized and chaotic conditions of the 1990s, state rebuilding in the region, in part due to informal collusive agreements, has resulted in broadly two types of state: politically centralized and non-competitive states on the one hand and politically centralized and competitive ones on the other. These two broad categories exhibit very different features now in terms of the form and depth of corruption and collusion, as I will show. As the Baltic States -Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -were in the Soviet Union for a shorter period of time of the depth and form of collusion in these different regime types. I then go on to give examples and describe these forms of collusion in more detail in the two types of regime -competitive and non-competitive -that now predominate across the region.
Regime Type Extent and form of collusion Examples
Chaotic and decentral- Early years of transition in most post-Soviet republics Georgia (1991 ( -2004 ( ) Russia (1991 ( -1996 ; Ukraine (1991 Ukraine ( -1994 2004 Kyrgyzstan (1991-1996; 2005-2006) , Tajikistan (1991 Tajikistan ( -1996 Regime Type 
Extent and form of collusion Examples

Non-competitive and centralized regimes
The non-competitive and centralized regime type is the dominant category across post-Soviet 
Competitive and centralized regime type
In the competitive and centralized regime type, the incumbent regime and hence the state is still the dominant actor. However, business people and criminal leaders have more room to maneuver due to several loci of power in a politically contested environment. Political elites are often keen to use criminal leaders in political battles especially for bullying political and economic competitors, blackmailing investigative journalists or as the muscle during the public demonstrations.
In this regime type, organized crime and the state function in an uneasy equilibrium.
On the one hand, under certain conditions criminal leaders may try to dictate their interests. with corruption due to a highly cohesive, relatively youthful and disciplined political elite that clamped down on the collusive arrangements of the past as well as reducing political competition. This elite was western-oriented. The key variable of leadership orientation meant that Georgia's increasingly autocratic leadership attempted to dismantle collusive arrangements rather than appropriate them. However, the Georgian model of reducing collusion came at large social costs and damage to democratic accountability. It also emerged in very specific conditions of revolution that seem unlikely to be emulated in other countries of the region for now.
Conclusion
As the events in Ukraine in 2014 have shown, collusion and corruption can be direct causes of protests and destabilization. Political, economic and criminal elites blur into one
another. This paper attempted to understand collusion in post-Soviet Eurasia from a broad
perspective. In what ways does collusion differ across the region and why?
As I have shown, from a chaotic and decentralized transition period the countries of the region, excluding the Baltic States, can be divided into two broad categories. These are roughly non-competitive, autocratic regimes and competitive, fragile democracies. I have suggested that these two regime types exhibit variation in the form and extent of collusion in them. Fragile democracies at least provide the possibility for a genuine attack on collusion, as the case of Georgia, however controversially, shows. Unfortunately, the predominant regime type in the region is non-competitive autocracy. These regimes, from Russia to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, possess dominant ruling elites that collude to control business and organized crime.
In thinking about the wider lessons of this discussion, former Soviet Union countries possess some exceptionality due to the legacy of the strong Soviet state when compared to The non-competitive and centralized regime type can be observed in many world regions, for example contemporary Venezuela (Ruiz and Flores 2009) or Charles Taylor's Liberia (Reno 1995 semi-independent actors in crony capitalist systems that add to the dynamics of corruption in these countries. Second, as elaborated above, the nexus between politics and business is much more ingrained given the initial role of the state in the redistribution and privatization of state assets in the 1990s (Ganev 2005 ). Generally, cross-regional comparisons especially with Africa and Latin America are lacking and could become a fruitful area of further research.
This paper suggests that political competition delineates the nature of corruption and collusion in the post-Soviet region. It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss fully how to tackle the blurring of states with organized and white-collar crime. Where greater competition exists, I have found that organized crime and business interests can exploit that competition and influence the state. However, political competition provides at least the possibility for robust anti-corruption campaigns. The experience of Georgia and the Baltic States suggests that a break with the past in which cohesive elites emerge with an agenda based on genuine commitment to reform is vitally important. So too is engagement from Western states and institutions. However, even in the cases of success stories political corruption and the interwoven networks of corrupt influence remain problematic. Low-level bureaucratic corruption is addressed while parts of the political elite may still be involved in corruption. Still, fragile democracies in the region -the most pressing example is today's Ukraine -are still the most likely future corruption fighters and therefore deserve support, even if they are much weaker in the present day than the autocracies of the region.
